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to distant worlds, to commune with animals or nonhuman beings, and so 
forth. All of these can fairly be described as “natural” desires, shared by 
all or nearly all normal human beings. So, too, is the natural fantasy to live 
forever and achieve ultimate happiness in union with the summum bonum, 
God. but there is no reason to think that all or even most natural fantasies 
have objects that can satisfy them. why, then, unless there is something 
compellingly different about it, should we think that our wishful desire to 
achieve infinite happiness with God has an object that can satisfy it? 
Is Lewis’s argument from desire thus of no evidential value? by no 
means. For the convinced theist, one who reasonably believes on other 
grounds that God is loving and faithful, the experience of Joy, and more 
generally the desire for eternal happiness and union with God, can indeed 
provide support for belief in life after death. As Aquinas argues, it does 
seem that if there is a loving, all-perfect being God, he would not frustrate 
our deep human longing for what the Cambridge Platonist John Smith 
called “a blissful fruition of himself.” what this means is that Lewis’s ar-
gument must be seen—as it was almost certainly intended—as part of a 
cumulative case for the Christian faith.
wielenberg’s God and the Reach of Reason offers an admiring yet critical 
appraisal of Lewis’s principal arguments for Christian belief. It is must 
reading for Lewis fans who value—as Lewis himself pre-eminently did—
clear prose and rigorous logic.
The Uses of Paradox: Religion, Self-Transformation, and the Absurd, by Matthew 
bagger. Columbia University Press, 2007. Pp. 152. $36.50 (cloth)
STePHeN S. bUSH, brown University
In The Uses of Paradox, Matthew Bagger examines the status of paradox 
in various religious and philosophical texts, concentrating especially on 
Pseudo-Dionysius and Søren Kierkegaard, but giving attention to Ch-
uang-Tzu, Nāgārjuna, and Pyrrhonian sceptics as well. Drawing on cogni-
tive dissonance theory in psychology, bagger notes that most people who 
have grounds to accept contradictory beliefs are motivated to avoid self-
contradiction either by demonstrating that despite initial appearances the 
beliefs are in fact compatible or by rejecting one or more of the beliefs. 
what is of interest to him, however, is that despite this psychological ten-
dency to eliminate contradiction, a number of religious and philosophical 
authors esteem paradox and, in doing so, actively embrace the dissonance 
of contradiction.
The principal argument of Uses of Paradox concerns cases in which 
individuals embrace paradox. The heart of the book, in the second and 
third chapters, advances two principal claims. First, bagger wants to say 
that when a religious person embraces paradox, he or she typically puts 
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it to one of two possible uses, which bagger labels cognitive asceticism 
and mysticism. both uses aim to cultivate self-transformation. Cognitive 
ascetics seek the dissonance that paradox engenders for the same reasons 
that other ascetics subject themselves to physical discomfort and pain. The 
point of the ascetic practices, whether cognitive or physical, is to reorient 
the individual away from temporal ends and toward transcendent ones. 
kierkegaard serves as bagger’s example of a cognitive ascetic. The Danish 
philosopher embraces the Christian paradoxes, especially the one concern-
ing the relation of the infinite, eternal God to the temporal, human subject, 
and claims that affirming the contradictions, despite their absurdity, orients 
the subject away from reliance on the relativity of human existence and 
toward the absolute and eternal God. Mystics, for their part, actively com-
mend the contradictions of the paradoxes of their faith, just as the cognitive 
ascetics do. However, for the mystics, and here bagger supplies Pseudo-
Dionysius as the prime example, the paradox serves as an occasion for the 
achievement of a mystical state in which a higher type of cognition than the 
cognition involved in reasoning is achieved. The contradiction the paradox 
presents is the means to this higher cognitive state, a state that is inexpress-
ible in human language. Since the mystic uses paradox in this manner, she 
or he is not troubled by the cognitive dissonance of the paradox; what mat-
ters is the higher cognitive plane achieved in the mystical state. 
The second principal claim bagger wants to advance is that when a reli-
gious practitioner embraces paradox, the determination of whether he or 
she adopts the attitude of a cognitive ascetic or a mystic is a matter of his 
or her attitude toward his or her own social group and those outside that 
group. Here bagger draws on anthropologist Mary Douglas’ theory that a 
society’s attitude toward anomalous creatures, animals that do not fit neat-
ly into the society’s classification scheme, is determined by the society’s at-
titude toward those outside the social group. A society that is threatened 
by outsiders will treat anomalous animals as abominations, symbolically 
investing the animals with their concern to maintain the integrity of their 
own boundary. A society not so threatened, on the other hand, will have 
a tolerant attitude toward anomalous animals. Bagger suggests that para-
doxes function in a similar manner. Paradoxes can represent the outsider 
because they stand outside the boundaries of reason and understanding. 
This has two implications. First, the more an individual is concerned with 
the external boundary of her or his social group, the more likely she or he 
will be to show concern about the external boundaries of her or his reason 
and understanding. The individual will manifest this concern by treating 
paradoxes as irresolvable, leaving them outside the bounds of rationality, 
and adopting the attitude of either cognitive asceticism or mysticism. The 
second implication is that whether such an individual views outsiders as a 
threat or prefers to see them incorporated into the social group influences 
whether the individual adopts the attitude of asceticism or mysticism. An 
individual who sees outsiders as a threat will maximize the dissonance in 
paradoxes, refusing to incorporate the paradox into the bounds of reason 
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just as he or she wishes to refuse to incorporate the outsider into the social 
group. This is to adopt cognitive asceticism. The individual who sees ben-
efits from bringing the outsider into the social group, on the other hand, 
will take the mystical option, minimizing the dissonance, not by resolving 
the paradox, but by treating it as a revelatory means to a higher cognitive 
state in mystical union. 
The last two chapters of the book take on related, but distinct themes 
from the central argument on social boundaries and paradox. Chapter 4 
examines the cosmogonic question of why there is something rather than 
nothing, a question that bagger sees as involving a paradox between ab-
solute transcendence and immanence, since an answer to the question re-
quires reference to something that must absolutely transcend the causal 
order, but must also be part of the causal order, since it itself is a cause (of 
the causal order). bagger argues that the question is in actuality a pseudo-
question. He appeals to bas van Fraassen’s requirement that any request for 
an explanation has to identify, implicitly at least, some portion of the causal 
order as relevant to the explanation. but since the nothingness to which 
the cosmogonic question refers has no causal order, the question does not 
meet van Fraassen’s requirements, and so is not a real explanation request. 
bagger thinks the cosmogonic question is at the heart of many mystical 
and religious practices and so these practices rest on mistaking a pseudo-
question for a real question. In the final chapter, Bagger turns to skepticism, 
and he appeals to C. S. Peirce’s philosophy to show that the Pyrrhonian 
skeptics’ attempt to deny that they subscribe to any beliefs is belied by their 
involvement in practical affairs, an involvement that evidences commit-
ment to various beliefs. Then, returning to the theme of social boundaries 
and paradox, bagger claims that the case of the Pyrrhonians shows that an 
opposition to social boundaries generates a tendency toward skepticism. 
Bagger’s attempt to explain the adoption of each type of attitude toward 
paradox in terms of an individual’s orientation toward social boundaries 
faces several difficulties. First is the problem of the small sample size. Bag-
ger presents his work as appropriating social scientific methodology, but 
no proper social scientific result could be established on a sample size of 
a half dozen or so individuals. The specifics of Bagger’s arguments are 
problematic, too. bagger says that what is at issue in regard to paradox 
is the “external boundary of whatever social group most preoccupies a 
thinker,” but he seems to assume that one can easily ascertain the identity 
of the social group of most concern to a thinker. Any member of a society 
is involved in a whole host of social groups and subgroups, pertaining to 
ethnicity, nationality, geography on the local and regional scale, gender, 
occupation or trade, economy, family or kin, religion, and so on. It is im-
plausible to think that in general any one of these is the subject of para-
mount, lasting concern for any individual. Rather, different social identi-
ties matter in different contexts, and people typically visit various contexts 
through the course of any given day, as they go about their affairs. Matters 
of social identity are complicated, not easily transparent either to oneself 
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or a theorist. The variety of social identities that individuals inhabit results 
in a temptation for a social theorist with bagger’s concerns to engage in 
gerrymandering, selecting for an individual the social identity that con-
firms the hypothesis over the individual’s social identities that do not. I 
suspect bagger is guilty of this. According to bagger, in Pseudo-Dionysus’ 
case, it is the boundary between the church and the rest of society that 
matters; in the case of John of the Cross, it is the boundary between the 
discalced and observant Carmelites; in the case of Nicholas of Cusa, it 
is at one point in bagger’s argument the boundary between the western 
Church and the eastern Church, at another that between Christians and 
Turks; for Ta-hui Tsung-kao, it is the boundary between his Ch’an lineage 
and a rival one. The object of the Pyrrhonian skeptics’ concern is not even 
their own society, but the social boundaries of philosophical sects to which 
they do not belong. The case of Kierkegaard, a central figure in the argu-
ments of Uses of Paradox, is particularly unconvincing, since the boundary 
that bagger says most concerns the Dane is the boundary between true 
Christians and Christendom, a boundary that is marked by a subjective, 
inward relationship to God, not at all a social boundary in any conven-
tional sense. bagger’s hypothesis is interesting to be sure, but it is far too 
underdeveloped to exhibit independent merits, and it involves too many 
differences from Douglas’ theories to benefit from her evidence and argu-
mentation. Douglas’ theories involve societies and their symbolic relation 
to bodies, human and animal. bodies are amenable to represent societies 
symbolically, according to Douglas, because bodies are concrete and have 
distinct and perceivable boundaries, and bodies’ various functions, waste 
products, and orifices confront the members of a society in tangible ways. 
bagger, in contrast, wants to use things highly abstract, such as reason 
and understanding, to serve as a symbolic representation of society. It is 
doubtful that something so abstract as the boundaries of reason would be 
fit to represent the boundaries of society in the way Bagger suggests.
The conclusion to Uses of Paradox has some puzzling features, in that 
bagger positions his book as an exhibition of the superiority of naturalistic 
approaches to paradox over supernaturalistic ones. He says he has given 
a convincing social-psychological explanation for the religious fascination 
with paradox and so rendered “metaphysical” explanations superfluous. 
He even goes so far as to say his approach is emancipatory, implying I 
suppose that one who subscribes to supernaturalistic or metaphysical ac-
counts of paradox is in and/or perpetuating bondage of some sort. This 
is all somewhat distracting, both because he has not substantiated these 
claims and because his explanatory hypotheses are compatible, as far as I 
can tell, with approaches to paradox that endorse supernatural and meta-
physical realities. Nevertheless, bagger’s recommendation that we look at 
paradoxes not just as a problem for logical investigation, but as matters 
with practical implications, is valuable, and his distinction between ascetic 
and mystical appropriations of paradox is an important contribution to 
the study of religion.
